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PROLOGUE.
November 13, 2015, was a beautiful winter night in Paris-or, at
least it started out that way.' Thousands of spectators attended the
football match between Germany and France at the Stade de France. 2
The American rock band Eagles of Death Metal was playing in front of
hundreds of fans in the Bataclan Concert Hall 3 while other residents and
tourists went out to enjoy the bars and restaurants around the famed
"City of Light."4 Shortly after nine o'clock, a large explosive was
detonated outside the Stade de France.5 Islamic terrorists commenced a
series of coordinated and violent attacks upon the heart of France's
capital killing 130 people. 6 By eleven o'clock, Paris was under a state
of emergency.7 A beautiful winter night in Paris transformed into a
night of unimaginable horror.8
Meanwhile, in the United States, CIA director John Brennan
pressures Congress to increase government surveillance.9 The recent
terrorist attacks in Paris and San Bernardino,10 renewed a debate on how
1. See Paris Attacks: What Happened on the Night, BBC NEWS (Dec. 9, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34818994.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See generally id.
9. Andrea Peterson & Brian Fung, Paris Attacks Should Be "Wake Up Call"
For More Digital Surveillance, CIA Director Says, WASH. POST (Nov. 16, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2015/11/16/paris-attacks-
should-be-wake-up-call-for-more-digital-surveillance-cia-director-says/. But see Kim
Zetter, After Paris Attacks, Here's What the CIA Director Gets Wrong About
Encryption, WIRED (Nov. 16, 2015, 5:50 PM), http://www.wired.com/2015/1 1/paris-
attacks-cia-director-john-brennan-what-he-gets-wrong-about-encryption-backdoors/
(discussing four reasons why intelligence agency's contentions about using
encryption data is misplaced).
10. See generally San Bernardino Shooting: What We Know So Far, BBC
NEWS (Dec. 11, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-34993344
(discussing the December 9, 2015, San Bernardino shootings, as the FBI investigate
this as a terrorist attack).
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to balance Americans' privacy interests with the importance of national
security."I
Based on these security concerns, the desire for new surveillance
programs in the United States seems rational; however, it should be
noted that the French Surveillance Bill "did nothing to stop [the Paris]
attacks." 12 In May 2015, the French National Assembly voted to expand
its already comprehensive surveillance operation due to the terrorist
attack that occurred months earlier. 13 These additional provisions
authorized intelligence services to monitor phone calls and emails
without a warrant. 14 Increasing government surveillance similar to the
French Surveillance Bill presents scenarios that implicate the Fourth
Amendment.15 James Madison said it best:
Since the general civilization of mankind, I believe there are more
instances of the abridgment of freedom of the people by gradual and
silent encroachments by those in power than by violent and sudden
usurpations. On a candid examination of history we shall find that
turbulence, violence, and abuse of power by the majority trampling
on the rights of the minority, have produced factions and
commotions, which in republics, have more frequently than any
11. See Tom McCarthy, Surveillance Must Increase After Terror Attacks, Say
2016 Candidates, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 6, 2015, 1:07 PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/ 2 015/dec/06/paris-attacks-san-bemardino-
shooting-surveillance-hillary-clinton-donald-trump-election. Presidential candidate
Hilary Clinton agreed that new government surveillance is needed, but also
understood that "[n]obody wants to be feeling like their privacy is invaded." Id. In
contrast, Donald Trump wanted to increase government surveillance that includes
tracking entire families and maintain a database on American Muslims. Id. Jeb Bush
described Trump's suggestion as "abhorrent" because the United States has all the
capability "to monitor people that are in our country trying to attack us." Id.
12. Peterson & Fung, supra note 9 (noting that France's new bill was unable to
prevent the recent Paris attacks).
13. Alissa J. Rubin, Lawmakers in France Move to Vastly Expand Surveillance,
N.Y. TIMES (May 5, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/06/world/europe/
french-legislators-approve-sweeping-intelligence-bill.html?_r-0. On January 7,
2015, terrorists entered the French satirical magazine office of Charlie Hebdo and
killed twelve people. Amanda Goodman, Blocking Pro-Terrorist Websites: A Balance
Between Individual Liberty and National Security in France, 22 Sw. J. INT'L L. 209,
224 (2016). The satirical magazine was infamous for its "less-then flattering
depictions of the Prophet Mohammed." Id.
14. See Rubin, supra note 13.
15. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
87
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other cause produced despotism. If we go over the whole history of
the ancient and modem republics, we shall find their destruction to
have generally resulted from those causes. 16
I. INTRODUCTION
Thirty years ago, the Stored Communications Act ("SCA") was
enacted to regulate and monitor government procedures used to compel
electronic stored information from its citizens.17 Privacy advocates
hotly opposed the statute for authorizing warrantless access to emails
and tracking cellphones using cell site location data.' 8 Scholars and
legal professionals alike are quick to point out that the SCA's
warrantless access to electronic stored information violates the Fourth
Amendment, and is incompatible with the advances of modem
technology.' 9
16. James Madison, Speech in the Virginia Ratifying Convention on Control of
the Military (June 16, 1788), in THE HISTORY OF THE VIRGINIA FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1788, WITH SOME ACCoUNT OF EMINENT VIRGINIANS OF THAT ERA
WHO WERE MEMBERS OF THE BODY (Vol. 1) 130 (High Blair Grigsby et al. eds.,
1890).
17. See S. Rep. No. 99-541, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. at 3 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3557.
18. See Email Privacy Act, Hearing Before the United States Judiciary Comm.,
699 H.R. 114th Cong. 1st Sess., at 3-4 (2015-2016) (statement of Chris Calabrese,
Vice President of Center for Democracy & Technology),
https://judiciary.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Calabrese-Testimony-1.pdf;
Electronic Communication Privacy Act (ECPA) (Part II): Geolocation Privacy and
Surveillance, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Investigations,
of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 50, at 29 (2013) (testimony of
Catherine Cramp, American Civil Liberties Union Staff Attorney),
https://fas.org/irp/congress/2013_hr/ecpa2.pdf. Cf United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct.
945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Cuevas-Perez,
640 F.3d 272, 285 (7th Cir. 2011)) (describing that the "Government's unrestrained
power to assemble data that reveal private aspects of identity is susceptible to
abuse.. . . [M]onitoring . .. a substantial quantum of intimate information about any
person. . . 'may alter the relationship between citizens and government in a way
inimical to democratic society."').
19. See generally Orin S. Kerr, A User's Guide to the Stored Communications
Act, and a Legislators Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1233-42 (2004)
[hereinafter Kerr, SCA Guide] (concluding that Congress should amend the Stored
Communications Act due to its confusing and complex statutory language); Laurie
Buchan Serafino, I know My Rights, So You Gon' Need a Warrant for That: The
Fourth Amendment, Riley's Impact, and Warrantless Searches of Third-Party Clouds,
88 [Vol. 53
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The dispute behind warrantless access to emails and cell site
location data is critical because current Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence is inadequate to protect electronic stored information.20
This inadequacy stems from emails and cell site location data being
stored on equipment owned by a private service provider, thus invoking
the third-party doctrine-an exception to the warrant requirement. 2 1
Indeed, the federal government's capability to monitor emails and
track cellphones without a warrant is the type of "gradual and silent
encroachment" James Madison foreshadowed. 22 Current public opinion
shows people believe their government could do more to ensure their
privacy interests. 23 These searches violate the Fourth Amendment,
primarily because they occur without a warrant, but also because they
reveal intimate and sensitive information about an individual. 24 Thus,
the SCA should be amended because the language and its application
are plagued with legal fallacies that implicate the Fourth Amendment
and fail to adequately adjust to modem technology.
This Comment proposes that Congress amend the SCA, or at
minimum, enact legislation that affords digital privacy protections that
require a probable cause showing. New or amended privacy legislation
would enhance the public's perception of their government because it
would protect people's privacy interests and provide clear guidance for
law enforcement officers. 25 Part II provides background information
about Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Part III describes the SCA's
19 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 154, 185-91 (2014) (describing the unconstitutionality
behind the Stored Communications Act); Alicia Shelton, A Reasonable Expectation
of Privacy Online: "Do Not Track" Legislation, 45 U. BALT. L.F. 35, 46-48 (2014)
(discussing how Congress should update privacy legislation due to recent
technological innovations).
20. See In re United States for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 615 (5th
Cir. 2013); Rehberg v. Paulk, 611 F.3d 828, 846-47 (11th Cir. 2010).
21. See cases cited supra note 20; see also discussion infra Section II.B, III.A-
B.
22. See Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 42 (D.D.C. 2013), vacated and
remanded, 800 F.3d 559, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
23. Mary Madden, Public Perception of Privacy and Security in the Post-
Snowden Era, PEW RESEARCH CTR. 3 (Nov. 12, 2014),
http://www.pewinternet.org/files/2014/1 1/PI_PublicPerceptionsofPrivacyj 1 12 14 .p
df.
24. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
25. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 458 (1971).
2016] 89
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statutory framework. Part IV applies the SCA to emails and cell site
location data to demonstrate its inadequacy to uphold Fourth
Amendment protections, including the privacy implications of evolving
technology. Part V analyzes United States Supreme Court precedent
using Professor Kerr's equilibrium-adjustment theory to provide an
alternative solution to protect emails and cell site location data. Finally,
Part VI proposes that Congress amend the SCA's statutory framework,
and follow California's Electronic Communications Privacy Act of
2016 provisions for -law enforcement to obtain electronic stored
information.
II. FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
The historical context behind unreasonable searches was to protect
against arbitrary and intrusive invasions.26 This apprehension dates
back before the country was founded, when American colonists
opposed British custom officials who used general writs of assistance.27
The writs of assistance authorized British officers to arbitrarily
rummage through houses without restrictions looking for any evidence
of criminal activity.28 The colonists' opposition to these searches was
one primary reason behind the Revolutionary War.29 Accordingly,
when those same colonists won their independence they desired a law
that prevented those kinds of intrusions from occurring in their new
nation.30 The Fourth Amendment provided for "the right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, and [that] no warrant shall issue
26. See generally George C. Thomas III, Stumbling Towards History: The
Framers' Search and Seizure World, TEX. TECH. L. REV. 199, 206-10 (2010)
(discussing the reasons why the colonist opposed overbearing government abuse that
eventually lead to the Fourth Amendment's enactment).
27. See NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 56 (1937). These writs of
assistance authorized British custom officials to conduct indiscriminate searches that
remained effective during the sovereign's lifetime. Id.
28. Id. at 54.
29. Id. at 51. The author discusses three separate occasions about how Britain's
use of writs of assistance created a chain of events that led to the Declaration of
Independence and the American Revolutionary War. See generally id. at 56-73.
30. See id. at 51.
90 [Vol. 53
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but upon probable cause by Oath or affirmation . . . ."31 Therefore,
warrantless searches are unreasonable-subject to a few exceptions. 32
A. From a Physical Trespass to a Reasonable Expectation ofPrivacy
From the Fourth Amendment's ratification in 1791 until 1967, a
search inquiry was limited to a physical trespass against an individual's
constitutionally protected area. 33 Yet, as technology progressed,
limiting the amendment's protection to only a physical trespass search
created problematic situations. 34
In Olmstead v. United States,35 the United States Supreme Court
addressed whether installing a wiretap on a person's home telephone
without a warrant violated the Fourth Amendment.36 The Court held
that no search occurred because the telephone conversation was
intercepted without entering defendant's property. 3 7 Justice Brandeis
criticized the majority decision for failure to take into account the
technological advancements at the time. 38 Instead, the majority's
31. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
32. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 481 (1971); see, e.g., United
States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 808-09 (1982) (holding that a warrantless search against
a person's vehicle is allowed only if there is probable cause to search); United States
v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42-43 (1976) (holding that exigent circumstances arise when
officers are chasing a criminal suspect in a hot pursuit from a public place onto a
private residence); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (consenting
to searches results in a legal search that overrides the need for a search warrant and
probable cause).
33. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 371-72 (1967) (Black, J.,
dissenting). A Fourth Amendment search only applies to government actors and
government agents, not private actors. Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 662
(1980).
34. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 455. There, officers discovered that defendant was operating a
successful bootlegging business. See id. at 455-57. At the time, the United States
outlawed the possession, importation, or transportation of intoxicating liquors. U.S.
CONST. amend. XVIII, § 1, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
37. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466.
38. Id. at 472-73 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). See generally The Decades That
Invented the Future, Part 2: 1911-1920, WIRED GEAR (Oct. 25, 2012, 6:30 AM),
http://www.wired.com/2012/1 0/the-decades-that-invented-the-future-part-2-1911-
91
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rationale was based upon a narrow construction of the Fourth
Amendment's language.39 As Justice Brandeis noted, the Fourth
Amendment is much broader in scope and must evolve with the
"progress of science," rather than diminish an individual's privacy
interest. 40
Following the Olmstead decision, the Court continued to strictly
apply a trespass analysis. 41 By 1967, almost forty years later, the Court
finally deviated from its strict literalist approach emphasized under
Olmstead.42 In Katz v. United States,43 FBI agents installed a wiretap
outside a public phone booth.44 The Court recognized that a person who
enters a phone booth and shuts the door to make a private phone call
deserves constitutional protection.45 This is because the "Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places." 46 As such, the Court
formulated a new and separate Fourth Amendment search inquiry: (1)
whether an individual subjectively exhibits an expectation of privacy in
the places, containers, or effects searched; and (2) whether society
objectively recognizes that expectation of privacy as reasonable. 47
Thus, arose the reasonable expectation of privacy test.48
1920/ (discussing significant technological innovations within the first part of the
twentieth-century).
39. See Olmstead, 227 U.S. at 476 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
40. See id. at 474, 478.
41. See, e.g., Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 509-12 (1961) (holding
that a warrantless use of a spike mike installed against a heating duct at defendant's
house to overhear a conversation was a physical trespass). But see Goldman v. United
States, 316 U.S. 129, 134-36 (1942) (holding that a warrantless use of a detectaphone
installed at defendant's adjoining office without penetrating his wall was not a
physical trespass).
42. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). A strict literalist
approach is interpreting the Fourth Amendment under property law concepts that
limits Fourth Amendment protections to only physical intrusions, rather than a
person's tangible item. Thomas K. Clancy, What is a "Search " Within the Meaning
of the Fourth Amendment?, 70 ALB. L. REv. 1, 17 (2006).
43. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1942).
44. Id. at 348. FBI agents recorded defendant's conversation that revealed his
involvement with illegal interstate gambling. Id.
45. Id. at 352.
46. Id. at 351.
47. See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
48. Id.
92 [Vol. 53
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B. The Third-Party Doctrine
Whether an individual maintains a reasonable expectation of
privacy depends upon "[w]hat [that] person knowingly exposes to the
public." 49 This is because a person loses any reasonable expectation that
information voluntarily shared with a third party will remain private.50
The third-party doctrine developed from cases involving defendants
disclosing their illegal activities to an informant or an undercover
agent.51 The Fourth Amendment does not protect a person's misplaced
confidence that a third party will not reveal the communicated illegal
activity.52 The United States Supreme Court and lower courts have
applied the third-party doctrine broadly.53
In United States v. Miller,54 the Court found the defendant had no
privacy expectations in his bank account records.55 Despite the
defendant's assumption that his financial records would be used for a
limited purpose, he was unable to claim an interest in "ownership []or
possession." 56 Instead, the bank had possessory interest over the
defendant's account records because the financial documents were used
during "the ordinary course of business."57 When the defendant
49. Id. at 351 (majority opinion).
50. See Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV.
561, 563 (2009) [hereinafter Kerr, Third-Party]..
51. E.g., United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751-52 (1971); Hoffa v. United
States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966); United States v. Lopez, 373 U.S. 427, 438-39
(1963); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 753-54 (1952); Kerr, Third-Party,
supra note 48, at 567-68.
52. Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 302.
53. See SEC v. Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 743 (1984); Payner v.
United States, 447 U.S. 727 (1980); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979); United
States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 735, 743-44
(1973); see also infra Part IV.B.
54. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
55. Id. at 444-45. There, the government subpoenaed defendant's bank, which
revealed his involvement in an illegal whiskey distillery. Id. at 437-3 8.
56. See id. at 440. Here, the defendant had no privacy interest over his financial
records suggests that he lacked any standing. See id. at 440-41; see also Rakas v.
Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1978) (explaining that standing focuses on the person
challenging the illegality of a search and whether that person has any privacy interest
in the area searched).
57. Miller, 425 U.S. at 442-43.
93
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voluntarily turned over his financial documents to the bank, he assumed
the risk that the bank would turn these over to the government.58
Similarly, in Smith v. Maryland, the Court applied the third-party
doctrine to telephone numbers dialed. 59 Without a warrant, officers
used a pen register that revealed the defendant had recently committed
a robbery and made criminal threats against his victim.60 In applying
Katz, the Court found that unlike a wiretap, a pen register only reveals
telephone numbers dialed, and not the contents of a telephone
conversation.61 As in Miller, the defendant lacked any privacy
expectations because he voluntarily conveyed the phone numbers
dialed to the telephone company within the "ordinary course of
business." 62 As such, defendant assumed the risk because he should
have known that all phone numbers dialed are transmitted to the
telephone company.63 Scholars and legal practitioners alike have
heavily criticized these decisions applying the third-party doctrine. 64
According to critics, judges who cannot recognize bank records and
phone records as being entitled to a reasonable expectation of privacy
are out of touch with society.65 From a practical standpoint, in a
contemporary society people expect their financial records to remain
confidential because banks are an essential component of a market
economy.66 As Justice Marshall pointed out, unless society is willing to
relinquish personal or professional necessities, "[i]t is idle to speak of
'assuming' the risks in context where, as a practical matter, individuals
have no realistic alternative." 67
58. See id. at 443-44.
59. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745-46 (1979).
60. Id. at 737. A pen register records numbers dialed on a telephone through
electrical impulses each time a number is dialed. Id. at 736 n.1.
61. Id. at 741.
62. Id. at 744-45.
63. Id. at 742.
64. Kerr, Third-Party, supra note 50, at 563 n.5, 564 (citing to numerous books
and articles that criticized the third-party doctrine). Professor Orin Kerr describes the
third party doctrine as the Lochner to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Id. at 563. It
is the "rule scholars love to hate." Id.
65. Id. at 570.
66. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 449-51 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
67. Smith, 442 U.S. at 750 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
94 [Vol. 53
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Nonetheless, the decision in Smith called into question the privacy
interest in confidential information handed to a third party.68 As Justice
Brandeis foreshadowed, technological innovations have made
government intrusion upon a person's privacy without legal
ramifications possible. 69 With the advancements in information
technology, Congress recognized that Fourth Amendment protection
remained unclear for people's personal effects left for storage and
processing on computers. 70
III. THE STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT: A STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
During the 1980's, existing federal law was unable to keep up with
modernized communication, computer technology, and the
telecommunication industry.71 In response, Congress enacted the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 ("ECPA") to protect
against unauthorized seizures of electronic surveillance. 72 ECPA aimed
to create a balance between Americans' privacy expectations and law
enforcement interests. 73 Accordingly, ECPA created three governing
statutes: (1) the Wiretap Act, 74 (2) the Stored Communications Act, 75
and (3) the Pen Register Statute. 76
The legislative intent behind the Stored Communications Act
("SCA") was to protect electronic communications stored with Internet
Service Providers by incorporating Fourth Amendment like
68. See Kerr, SCA Guide, supra note 19, at 1210-11.
69. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
70. See S. Rep. No. 99-541, at 3 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555,
3557.
71. See id. at 2, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3556.
72. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100
Stat. 1848 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
73. S. Rep. No. 99-541, supra note 67, at 5, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
3559.
74. The Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22 (2012).
75. The Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-12 (2012).
76. The Pen Register Statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-27 (2012). For purposes of
this comment, I will only discuss section 2703 of the Stored Communications Act.
See S. Rep. No. 99-541, supra note 70, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, for
legislative history and information about the Wiretap Act and the Pen Register Statute.
952016]
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protections.77 This privacy protection limits the government's ability to
compel an Internet Service Provider to disclose subscriber
information. 78 Ultimately, the SCA protects two classes of service
providers: electronic communication services and remote computing
services providers. 79
A. Electronic Communication Service & Remote Computer
Service Dichotomies
Before describing the procedures for compelling disclosure, a basic
understanding about the differences between an electronic
communication service ("ECS") and a remote computer service
("RCS") is needed.80 These differences determine whether a person is
entitled to SCA protections.81
An ECS is a service that provides users with the capacity to transmit
electronic communications. 8 2 An ECS is most protected while an
electronic communication is in electronic storage.83 Sending an
electronic communication enables electronic storage incident to
transmission, and the communication is stored for backup purposes. 84
77. See Kerr, SCA Guide, supra note 19, at 1212. An electronic communication
is defined as "any transfer of signs, signals, writings, images, sounds, data, or
intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a radio, electromagnetic,
photoelectronic or photooptical system that affects interstate or foreign
commerce ... ." 18 U.S.C.A. § 2510(12) (2012).
78. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2012).
79. Kerr, SCA Guide, supra note 19, at 1213-14.
80. See id. at 1215. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15) (defining ECS as "any
service which provides to users thereof the ability to send or receive wire or electronic
communications"), with 18 U.S.C. § 2711(2) (defining RCS as "the provision to the
public of computer storage or processing services by means of electronic
communications systems").
81. See Kerr, SCA Guide, supra note 19, at 1213.
82. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15).
83. See id. § 2703(a); see also id. § 2510(17)(A)-(B) (defining electronic
storage as "any temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or electronic communication
incidental to the electronic transmission thereof; and any storage of such
communication by an electronic communication service for purposes of back up
protection of such communication").
84. See id. § 2510(17)(A)-(B); UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
PROSECUTING COMPUTER CRIMES 92 (2d ed. 2010) [hereinafter PROSECUTING
96 [Vol. 53
13
Aguilar: Privy or Private: A New Age Look at Old School Privacy Laws
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2016
2016] A NEW AGE LOOK AT OLD SCHOOL PRIVACY LAWS
To provide some context, courts interpret emails as an ECS in electronic
storage only when the email is unread as it sits unopened on a service
provider awaiting the recipient's retrieval.85 At this stage, the email is
classified as an ECS in electronic storage because the email is stored as
a "temporary and intermediate measure pending the recipient's retrieval
of the communication from the service provider." 86
In contrast, an RCS is a provider that offers the public long-term
storage services, and computer processing services through electronic
communication systems.87 In essence, an RCS acts like a storage
facility that stores or processes data to customers (the public).88 A key
distinction between an ECS and an RCS is that an RCS must be
available to the public. 89 An email web service like Gmail is a public
provider because any member from the general population could
register for an account. 90 By contrast, a university that provides students
an email account is not considered an RCS because it is limited only to
students. 91 Yet, electronic communications may also act as both an ECS
and RCS or as neither. 92
COMPUTER CRIMES], https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-
ccips/legacy/2015/01/14/ccmanual.pdf; Kerr, SCA Guide, supra note 19, at 1216.
85. See, e.g., Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 107, 114-15 (3d Cir.
2003) (holding that there was no SCA protection once the emails were read because
it was no longer in "temporary, intermediate, storage."); PROSECUTING COMPUTER
CRIMES, supra note 84; Kerr, SCA Guide, supra note 19, at 1216.
86. U.S. STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTER AND
OBTAINING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 123-24 (3d ed.
2009) [hereinafter SEARCHING AND SEIZING], https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/
files/criminal-ccips/legacy/2015/01/14/ssmanual2009.pdf.
87. 18 U.S.C. § 2711(2) (2009); Kerr, SCA Guide, supra note 19, at 1214; see,
e.g., Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. Youtube, Inc., 253 F.R.D. 256, 264-65 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
(holding that Youtube acted as an RCS provider because it allows the public to upload
videos). An electronic communication system is "simply the means by which an RCS
provides computer storage or processing services." Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating
Co., Inc., 529 F. 3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2008), rev'd on other grounds sub nom, City
of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746 (2010).
88. SEARCHING AND SEIZING, supra note 86, at 119.
89. Kerr, SCA Guide, supra note 19, at 1226.
90. See id.
91. Id. at 1226.
92. Id. at 1215-16; see, e.g., United States v. Weaver, 636 F. Supp. 2d 769, 770
(C.D. Ill. 2009) (holding that Microsoft's email service provider offered both ECS
and RCS services); In re Jetblue Airways Corp. Privacy Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d 299,
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Undoubtedly, courts have difficulty applying modem technology
to the SCA because the subtle distinctions between ECS and RCS
derive from technology in the 1980's. 93
B. Title 18 U.S.C. Section 2703
Title 18 of United States Code section 2703 regulates how the
government may compel a service provider to disclose a subscriber's
electronic communications. 94 Section 2703 creates different privacy
protections for electronic communications in an ECS and those in an
RCS. 9 5 To access ECS content information, a government must obtain
a warrant based upon probable cause only if the content information is
in electronic storage for less than 181 days. 96 After 180 days, a warrant
is no longer required.97
Instead, after 180 days, the government may use a process less
stringent than a warrant, so long as the subscriber receives prior
notice. 98 The government may access ECS content information stored
over 180 days, including RCS content information, using either a court
order or a subpoena. 99 Furthermore, a request for ECS and RCS non-
content information does not require notice to the subscriber. 00 Non-
309-10 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding that Jetblue Airways did not provide or act as an
ECS or RCS because operating a website does not make a company an internet service
provider).
93. See Kerr, SCA Guide, supra note 19, at 1213. Courts analyzing the SCA
have described it as a "complex, often convoluted area of the law." United States v.
Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir. 1998) (describing the unfortunate task of
conducting a legal analysis on the SCA because it is a "complex, often convoluted"
area of law); see United States v. Councilman, 418 F.3d 67, 80 (1st Cir. 2005)
(citations omitted); United States v. Steiger, 318 F.3d 1039, 1047 (11th Cir. 2003)
(citations omitted); Konop v. Hawaiin Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 874 (7th Cir. 2002)
(citations omitted).
94. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2012).
95. Id. § 2703(a)-(b).
96. Id. § 2703(a); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(d) (describing the procedures to
obtain a warrant).
97. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (a)-(b).
98. See id. § 2703(b)(1)(B).
99. Id. § 2703(b)(1)(B)(i)-(ii). An RCS does not require a warrant regardless of
whether an electronic communication has been stored less than 180 days. See id. §
2703(b).
100. Id. § 2703(c)(3).
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content information is classified as basic subscriber information or
other non-content information. 101 Access to basic subscriber
information merely requires an administrative subpoena that reveals a
subscriber's name, address, and telephone records.1 02 Access to other
non-content information requires a warrant, a court order, or the
subscriber's consent. 10
3
Content information is afforded the greatest protection because it
includes an electronic communication's substance. 104 Within the
context of emails, the actual text in the email's body is content
information, including the subject line because it carries a substantive
message. 05 By contrast, non-content information that is basic
subscriber information is deemed less private because the subscriber's
name, address, and telephonic records are knowingly exposed to the
service provider.1 06 Other non-content information includes account
usage records; cell site location data; email headers, excluding the
subject line; Internet Protocol addresses; and list of outgoing email
addresses. 107
101. See Kerr, SCA Guide, supra note 19, at 1228.
102. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(2). Other basic subscriber information includes
subscriber's address, length of service with the provider, and payment records. Id.
103. Id. § 2703(c).
104. See id. § 2510(8) (defining the contents of electronic communication as
"any information concerning the substances, purport, or meaning of that
communication"). Compare id. § 2703(b)(1)(B) (requiring notice to a subscriber if the
electronic communication is content information), with id. § 2703(c)(3) (requiring no
notice to the subscriber if the electronic information is non-content information). Cf
Warshak v. United States, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that a subscriber
is entitled to "a reasonable expectation of privacy to the contents of [his] emails").
105. Kerr, SCA Guide, supra note 19, at 1228.
106. See 18 U.S.C § 2703(c)(2)(A)-(F); see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 351 (1967) (stating that "[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even
in his own home or office, is not subject to Fourth Amendment protection.").
Subscriber information is knowingly exposed to a service provider because when a
person registers for an email account or purchases a cellphone that specific individual
voluntarily provides his name, address, and other basic information about himself.
See, e.g., Create your Google Account, https://accounts.google.com/SignUp (last
visited Oct. 19, 2016) (creating an email account for Google requires providing your
first and last name, date of birth, and mobile phone number).
107. Kerr, SCA Guide, supra note 19, at 1228; see also In re United States for
Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 605-06 (5th Cir. 2013) (describing cell site
location data as non-content information); United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500,
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Alternatively, the government may avoid providing prior notice to
a subscriber up to ninety days in the interests of justice.os Subsequent
delay may be extended for an additional ninety days.1 09 In doing so,
however, a court must find a reason to believe prior notice may cause
an adverse result.1 10 An adverse result is similar to that required under
the Fourth Amendment's exigent circumstances, and includes risks of
serious bodily injury or death, flight, destruction of evidence,
threatening witnesses, and jeopardizing investigations. 1 Ultimately, a
government entity has flexibility to compel disclosure of an
individual's email or cell site location data.
IV. THE SCA, FOURTH AMENDMENT, & TECHNOLOGY
Nearly thirty years later, the SCA is incompatible with modern
technology because technology has developed significantly since the
1980'S.11 2 The SCA was enacted with a noble purpose: to incorporate
Fourth Amendment like protections that might be subject to control
under the third-party doctrine.' 13 Yet, it ironically sets a low threshold
for the government to obtain electronic communications.l 14 Section
2703(d) reflects Terry v. Ohio's" 5 reasonable suspicion standard, a
510 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that the "to" and "from" addresses on emails does not
amount to reasonable expectations of privacy because it is non-content information).
108. 18 U.S.C. § 2705(a) (1986).
109. Id. § 2705(a)(4).
110. Id.
111. Id. § 2705 (a)(2).
112. See Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 874 (7th Cir. 2002)
(noting that "until Congress brings the laws in line with modem technology,
protection of the Internet and websites such as Konop's will remain a confusing and
uncertain area of law"). See generally Steve Almasy, The Internet Transforms Modern
Life, CNN (Oct. 10, 2005, 2:00 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2005/TECH/intemet/06/23/evolution.main/ (discussing the
Internet's impact on society).
113. See S. Rep. No. 99-541, supra note 70; Kerr, SCA Guide, supra note 19,
at 1212-13.
114. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703 (a)-(d).
115. Terry v. Ohio, 393 U.S. 1, 21-22, 28 (1968) (holding that officers are
authorized to temporarily seize a person based upon "specific and articulable facts
which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts" establish reasonable
suspicion that criminal activity is afoot).
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standard lower than probable cause. 116 In essence, it merely requires a
short factual summary describing the criminal investigation and how
the electronic communication would help further the investigation's
interest.11 7 This defeats the whole purpose behind the SCA's enactment.
Like the Fourth Amendment, the SCA should require a warrant based
upon probable cause to access emails and cell site location data.118
A. Email Technology
The SCA permits the government to obtain emails under 18 U.S.C.
§ 2703(a)-(b). 119 A basic understanding of emails is necessary to
understand why the SCA is incompatible with modem email systems.
The technology that currently enables a computer to communicate with
an email server is the Simple Mail Transfer Protocol ("SMTP"). 120 In
1986, the email server used for retrieving outgoing mail was the Post
Office Protocol ("POP").121 The POP downloaded every email and
116. United States v. Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196, 1201-02 (10th Cir. 2008).
Probable cause requires that law enforcement show that there is evidence of a "fair
probability" or a "substantial chance of discovering evidence of criminal activity."
Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 371 (2009) (citations
omitted). In contrast, reasonable suspicion requires a moderate chance to find
evidence of criminal activity. Id. Thus, reasonable suspicion is "obviously less
demanding" than probable cause. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989).
117. SEARCHING AND SEIZING, supra note 86, at 131. The Third and Fifth
Circuit courts have analyzed the SCA's plain language and legislative history to
determine whether a magistrate judge has the discretion to deny access to cell site
location data upon a showing of reasonable suspicion. Compare In re United States
for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 607 (5th Cir. 2013) (holding that SCA's
section 2703(d) requires a magistrate judge to issue a court order upon a showing of
reasonable suspicion), with In re United States for an Order Directing a Provider of
Elec. Commc'n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov't, 620 F.3d 304, 313 (3d Cir.
2010) (holding that SCA's section 2703(d) authorizes a magistrate judge to exercise
its discretion whether to require a warrant based upon probable cause or require a
showing of reasonable suspicion to access cell site location data).
118. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
119. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a)-(b)(2012).
120. See Achal Oza, Amend the ECPA: Fourth Amendment Protection Erodes
as Email Gets Dusty, 88 B.U. L. Rev. 1043, 1052 (2008).
121. Id.; see also Email Basics: POP3 Is Outdated; Please Switch to IMAP
Today, How-TO GEEK, http://www.howtogeek.com/197207/email-basics-pop3-is-
outdated-please-switch-to-imap-today/ (last visited April 6, 2016) [hereinafter Email
Basics].
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saved it onto a computer because the POP's megabyte had limited space
for email storage.' 22 In essence, emails sent in the 1980's were
fragmented because the process involved transferring the email from
server to server, and storing it at different locations, before the message
was actually downloaded onto a computer.1 2 3 Today, modem emails
have a high storage capacity and often sync with a webmail account
service like Gmail.1 24
To provide some context why the SCA's email protection is
incompatible with modem email systems, imagine an email is sent to a
Gmail account. While the email is unread and awaiting the recipient's
retrieval, the email is most protected because it is classified as an ECS
in electronic storage.1 25 If the email remains unread for 180 days or
more, the government is required to obtain a warrant to retrieve and
read the email.1 26 However, once the recipient reads the message, the
email is no longer classified as an ECS in electronic storage. 127 Instead,
the email is classified as an RCS, and no warrant is required because
the message is stored on Google's server. 128 The only way to protect an
email from a warrantless search is to never read the message or
download it onto a personal computer. 129 This is impractical because
technology has changed the way people access their emails, as
compared to 1986.130
To date, the United States Supreme Court has yet to address
whether an email is entitled to Fourth Amendment protection. But, there
is no reason to treat emails any different from a telephone conversation
or postal mail. 131 Despite the third-party doctrine, the United States
122. Emails Basics, supra note 121.
123. See Oza, supra note 120, at 1051-53; Emails Basics, supra note 121.
124. See Oza, supra note 120, at 1072-73; Emails Basics, supra note 121.
125. PROSECUTING COMPUTER CRIMES, supra note 84; Kerr, SCA Guide, supra
note 19, at 1216.
126. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2012); see also sources cited supra note 85.
127. SEARCHING AND SEIZING, supra note 80, at 124; Kerr, SCA Guide,. supra
note 19, at 1216.
128. Kerr, SCA Guide, supra note 19, at 1216.
129. See generally id.
130. See Oza, supra note 120, at 1073.
131. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967); Exparte Jackson, 96
U.S. 727, 733 (1877).
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Court of Appeal for the Sixth Circuit held that an email's content is
entitled to Fourth Amendment protection. 132
Although emails are stored with a third-party server, the Sixth
Circuit found that email communications were different from the bank
records in United States v. Miller, and the phone records in Smith v.
Maryland.133 This is because a service provider merely acts as an
intermediary. 134 Similar to a telephone company or a postal office, a
service provider only delivers and stores an email's message to the
recipient's server. 135 The Sixth Circuit reasoned that the "Fourth
Amendment must keep pace with the inexorable march of technological
progress, or its guarantees will wither and perish."l 36 Emails are the
"technological scion of tangible mail" that has become an essential
means of communication.1 37 It would defy contemporary standards of
living to deny emails Fourth Amendment protection.1 38 Thus, the Sixth
Circuit court found SCA's warrantless access to an email's contents
unconstitutional.1 39
Following Warshak, several courts agreed that individuals have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of electronic
information.1 40 Yet, in other jurisdictions, without an amended statute
or a United States Supreme Court decision, there is no deterrence to
132. Warshak v. United States 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010).
133. Id. at 287-88; see supra Section II.B.
134. See Warshak, 631 F.3d at 288.
135. Id. at 286-88.
136. Id. at 285.
137. Id. at 286.
138. See id.
139. Id. at 288.
140. See, e.g., Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 907 (9th
Cir. 2008) (finding a reasonable expectation of privacy to text messages) rev'd on
other grounds sub nom, City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746 (2010); United
States v. Zavala, 541 F.3d 562, 577 (5th Cir. 2008) (finding reasonable privacy
expectations to "private information, including emails," stored on a cellphone);
United States v. Ali, 870 F. Supp. 2d 10, 39 n.39 (D.D.C. 2012) (finding that an
email's contents exhibit reasonable expectations of privacy; In re Applications for
Search Warrant for Info. Associated with Target Email Address, No. 12-MJ-8119-
DJW, 2012 WL 4383917, at *5 (D. Kan. Sept. 21, 2012) (finding emails and faxes
stored with a service provider retained reasonable privacy expectations).
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officers accessing emails without a warrant. 14 1 Ultimately, those
defendants may be denied an exclusionary rule remedy. 142
B. Cellphone Tracking
Within the SCA, the government may access cell site location data
under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c). 143 Section 2703(c) treats cell site location
data as a non-content communication record.144 In essence, cell site
location data is treated as metadata information.1 4 5 Given that cell site
location data constitutes non-content information, the SCA does not
require a warrant. 146 Yet, like emails, cellphones are prevalent in
contemporary society. 147 To understand what cell site location data
actually is, it is important to know how cellphones operate.
Cellphones use radio waves to connect to users' service
providers. 14 8 Cellular providers preserve a network of radio cell towers
141. See Rehberg v. Paulk, 611 F.3d 828, 843-47 (11th Cir. 2010) (noting that
the law is unclear whether there is a reasonable expectation of privacy within the
contents of emails).
142. See Warshak, 631 F.3d at 289 (holding that defendant was denied an
exclusionary remedy due to officers' good faith reliance upon SCA's
constitutionality). The exclusionary rule is a remedy for a defendant because it
excludes evidence of guilt due to a Fourth Amendment violation. But see Illinois v.
Krull, 480 U.S. 342, 347 (1987) (explaining that when officers conducted a search
based upon reasonable reliance on statutory authority then the exclusionary rule does
not serve its purpose); Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 (2011) (holding that
"searches conducted in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent
are not subject to the exclusionary rule.")
143. See In re Application of the United States for Historical Cell Site Data,
724 F.3d 600, 605-06 (5th Cir. 2013).
144. See 18 U.S.C § 2703(c) (2012).
145. See United States v. DiTomasso, 56 F. Supp. 3d 584, 589-90 (S.D.N.Y.
2014) (describing non-content communication that is incidentally disclosed to third
parties as metadata information); see also Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 41
(D.D.C. 2013) (indicating that telephony metadata surveillance was likely
unconstitutional), vacated, 800 F.3d 559 (D.C. Cir. 2015). This case was vacated on
procedural grounds, and no decision was made on the constitutionality of telephone
metadata. Klayman v. Obama, 800 F.3d 559, 561 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
146. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c).
147. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2490 (2014).
148. See Electronic Communication Privacy Act (ECPA) (Part II): Geolocation
Privacy and Surveillance: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and
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throughout their coverage areas. 149 A cell site is a specific area near a
cell tower containing a wireless antenna that detects the radio signal and
spreads from a cellphone and connects to the local cellular network.15 0
These radio signals generate cellphone site location data.15 1
Whenever a cellphone makes or receives a call (or sends or receives
a text message), the phone connects through radio waves to an antenna
located on the nearest cell tower. 152 Accordingly, as individuals go
throughout their day, cellphones generate a detail database about their
current whereabouts over time. 153 Thus, cellular providers maintain
geographic location records on every American who uses a
cellphone.1 54
Law enforcement agencies often compel cell site location data from
private cell phone providers to track a person's past movements within
a geographic area.15 5 Just this past year, officers made tens of thousands
of requests to mobile carriers for cell site location data. 156 In 2014,
AT&T received 64,703 requests, and within the first half of 2015,
Verizon received more than 21,000 requests. 57
While the United States Supreme Court has yet to decide the
constitutionality behind cell site location data,158 there is no certainty
Investigations of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 43 (2013) [hereinafter
Geolocation Hearing] (oral testimony of Prof. Matthew Blaze, Univ. of Penn.).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 50 (written testimony of Prof. Matthew Blaze).
151. Id. at 43 (oral testimony of Prof. Matthew Blaze). See generally Thomas
A. O'Malley, Using Historical Cell Site Analysis Evidence in Criminal Trials, 59 U.S.
ATT'Y's BULLETIN 16, 19-21 (2011) (discussing the four basic components of how
cellular mobile phone network enables historical location data).
152. Geolocation Hearing, supra note 148, at 50 (Written testimony of Prof.
Blaze).
153. Robinson Meyer, Do Police Need a Warrant to See Where a Phone Is?,
THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 8, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/
2015/08/warrantless-cell-phone-location-tracking/ 4 00 7 7 5/.
154. In re United States for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-
Site Info., 809 F. Supp. 2d 113, 115 (E.D.N.Y. 2011).
155. See Meyer, supra note 153.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. But cf United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) (explaining that the government's ability to retrospectively track and
monitor a person's movements may offend reasonable privacy expectations).
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whether the government could know in advance that cell site location
data would reveal sensitive and intimate information about a person. 159
Most recently, federal appellate courts have applied section 2703(d) to
cell site location data.1 60
The Fourth Circuit found that warrantless access to cell site location
data for an extended time period is unconstitutional. 16 1 The Court
recognized cellphone users maintain reasonable privacy expectations in
their historical cell site location data when it provides a detailed account
about a person's past movements. 162 The Fourth Circuit rejected the
application of the third-party doctrine because cellphone users do not
voluntarily convey their cell site location data. 16 3
The Third Circuit also noted that cellphone users do not voluntarily
share their location information. 164 Rather than applying the third-party
doctrine, the Third Circuit instead compared cell site location data to
the beeper devices in United States v. Knotts1 65 and United States v.
159. See United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 350 (4th Cir. 2015) reh'gen
banc granted, 624 F. App'x. 75 (4th Cir. Oct. 28, 2015); cf United States v. Karo,
468 U.S. 705, 714-15 (1984) (noting that "private residence are places in which the
individual normally expects privacy free of governmental intrusions not authorized
by a warrant").
160. See Graham, 796 F.3d at 344-45. See generally United States v. Davis,
785 F.3d 498 (11th Cir. 2015); In re United States for Historical Cell Site Data, 724
F.3d 600 (5th Cir. 2013); In re United States for an Order Directing a Provider of
Elec. Commc'n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov't, 620 F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2010).
161. See Graham, 796 F.3d at 361.
162. See id. at 349-59 (holding that there was a search when officers inspected
defendant's historical cell site location data up to 221 days). But see United States v.
Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 516 (11th Cir. 2015) (holding that defendant had no privacy
interest in a full comprehensive account of his past movements because the cell tower
site did not create an "intimate portrait of [his] life").
163. Graham, 796 F.3d at 354-55 (noting that cell site location data is
automatically generated without any voluntary movement from a cellphone user).
164. United States for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc'n Serv.
to Disclose Records to the Gov't, 620 F.3d 304, 317 (3d Cir. 2010).
165. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983). Here, officers received
consent from a company to install a tracking beeper inside a five-gallon container of
chloroform. Id. at 278. The company's former employee had purchase chemicals for
drug manufacturing. Id. Unaware about the beeper, the former employee placed the
container inside his car. Id. Officers used the beeper for visual surveillance up until
the vehicle reached a private residence. Id. at 278-29. The Court held there was no
search because a "person traveling in an automobile on a public thoroughfares has no
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Karo1 6 6. 1 6 7 Ultimately, the Third Circuit held that .was not a search
because, unlike the beeper in Karo, the cell site location data did not
reveal anything inside defendant's private residence. 168
In contrast, the Eleventh and Fifth Circuits upheld the SCA's
reasonable suspicion standard for accessing cell site location data. 169
Both circuit courts found the third-party doctrine applied because
cellphone providers collect and store cell site location data as a business
record. 170 These circuit courts also noted that cellphone users assume
the risk because they should know that cellphones must send signals to
the nearest cell tower for their call to connect.17 1
Indeed, these cases show that with four circuit courts applying
different rationales for cell site location data, there is little guidance as
to SCA's proper standard. 172 Ultimately, a warrant should be required
reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another." Id. at
281.
166. United States v. Karro, 468 U.S. 705 (1984). Similar to Knotts, after
receiving consent, federal agents installed a beeper into a container of ether. Id. at
708. The beeper was used to track the container from a storage facility to several
locations, including defendant's private residence. Id. at 708-09. Unlike Knotts where
agents monitored the defendant on a public highway, here, agents used the beeper to
reveal information inside defendant's residence. Id. at 714-15. The Court held that
there was a search because agents without a warrant "obtain[ed] information that
[they] could not have obtained by observation from outside the curtilage ofthe house."
Id. at 715.
167. In re The United States for an Order, 620 F.3d at 312.
168. Id. at 312-13.
169. See United States v. Davis, 745 F.3d 1205, 1217 (11th Cir. 2014) (holding
that defendant did not voluntarily disclose his historical cell site location data, as to
relinquish a reasonable expectation of privacy), reh'g en banc granted, opinion
vacated, 573 F. App'x. 925 (11th Cir. 2014), rev'd en banc; 785 F.3d 498, 505-06
(11th Cir. 2015); In re United States for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 615
(5th Cir. 2013).
170. Davis, 785 F.3d at 511; In re United States for Historical Cell Site Data,
724 F.3d at 611-12.
171. Davis, 785 F.3d at 511-12; In re Application of the United States for
Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d at 612-13.
172. Compare United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 354 (4th Cir. 2015)
(holding that a cellphone user does not voluntarily reveal his cell site location
information because a service provider automatically generates such data in response
to connections made between the cellphone and the providers network), and In re
Application of the United States for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc'n
Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov't, 620 F.3d 304, 317 (3d Cir 2010) (noting that
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because cell site location data may track the movements inside an
individual's home; therefore, it intrudes on that individual's reasonable
expectation of privacy. 173
V. A NEW DIRECTION FOR FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
The United States Supreme Court has preferred to make bright-line
rules for police officers. 174 Yet, the SCA fails to provide simple
guidance for officers because it mandates different procedures for
various types of electronic information. 175 Given that technology has
evolved exponentially, the Court should modernize the third-party
doctrine to afford emails and cell site location data Fourth Amendment
protection; thus, requiring Congress to amend the SCA.
According to Professor Orin Kerr, Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence is based on an equilibrium-adjustment in response to
changes in technology and societal expectations.1 76 The purpose behind
equilibrium-adjustment is to balance the needs between privacy
interests and law enforcement.1 77 As technology progresses and
"when a cell phone user receives a call, he hasn't voluntarily exposed anything at
all."), with Davis, 785 F.3d at 512 n.12 (explaining that cellphone users voluntarily
convey their cell site location data to their cellphone providers whenever they make
or receive a call on their cellphone), and In re Application of the United States for
Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d at 613-14 (noting that cellphone users knowingly
convey general location data to cellphone providers).
173. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714-15 (1984).
174. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 n.19 (1981) (quoting Dunaway
v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213 (1979) (White, J., concurring)) (noting that "if police
are to have workable rules, the balancing of the competing interests inherent in the
Terry principle, 'must in large be part done on a categorical basis-not in an ad hoc,
case-by-case fashion by individual police officers.' The rule we adopt today does not
depend upon such an hoc determination, because the officer is not required to evaluate
either the quantum of proof justifying the detention or the extent of the intrusion to be
imposed by the seizure.").
175. See The Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2012).
176. Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth
Amendment, 125 HARV. L. REV. 476, 480 (2011) [hereinafter Kerr, Equilibrium]
(describing equilibrium adjustment as a "correction mechanism" to Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence because it is a judicial response from technological
changes and social practice when technological tools and "new practices threaten to
expand or contract police power in a significant way").
177. See id. at 482.
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threatens that balance, judicial interpretation from the United States
Supreme Court restores the status quo. 178
However, there are judicial delays before there is an equilibrium-
adjustment. 179 The Court may risk erroneous adjustments because
technology has yet to evolve to a stabilized state or societal practices
related to the technology at hand continue to evolve. 180 As an example,
Professor Kerr points to the near forty-year gap in Katz's reversal of
Olmstead.181 To test the validity of equilibrium-adjustment, the next
subsection will analyze United States Supreme Court decisions
concerning surveillance technology. 182
A. The Validity ofEquilibrium-Adjustment
Over the last thirty years, a-perplexing issue for the Court has been
applying the Fourth Amendment to surveillance technology. 183 Most
recently, in United States v. Jones 184 and California v. Riley,185 the
Court suggested that changes in technology might provide a new
direction for Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 186
In Jones, the Court held that attaching an electric monitoring device
to a person's vehicle without a warrant constituted a search.18 7 Some
may argue that this holding tilted the balance towards more privacy
rights because officers must secure a warrant before using a GPS tracker
178. Id. at 487-88.
179. Id. at 539.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Kerr's article on equilibrium-adjustment was published in 2011. This was
before the decisions in Jones and Riley.
183. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34-35 (2001) (holding that
the use of a thermal image outside a house to detect whether defendant was growing
marijuana was a search because it was a technological tool inaccessible to the public);
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986) (holding that a plane flying at 1,000 feet
in the air was not a search because the Fourth Amendment does not require officers
to "shield their eyes when passing by a home on a public thoroughfares"); Dow
Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986) (holding that taking aerial
photographs while flying at a navigable altitude was not a search).
184. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
185. California v. Riley, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
186. See id. at 2491-93; Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
187. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949 (majority opinion).
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device.188 Yet, this holding did not seem to shift the scale towards
privacy interests because it has been long established that in appropriate
circumstances, a warrant is preferable. 189 The FBI agents in Jones
secured a warrant; however, the agents exceeded the scope of the
warrant.190 Rather than tilting the balance towards privacy interests,
Jones left open the question whether a warrant is required when long-
term surveillance might reveals one's daily activities.1 91
Although the majority in Jones held that there was a search, the
concurring opinions criticized the majority's reasoning for applying a
physical trespass rationale.1 92 Both concurrences emphasized that the
Court's rationale should have utilized a reasonable expectation of
privacy test.193 The concurring opinions established that long-term
monitoring violates reasonable expectations of privacy.1 94 As
emphasized by the concurring opinions, the majority's decision
presented "little guidance"1 95 and "vexing problems." 96 Without this
clear guidance, no adjustments were made because Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence remained the same and individuals' privacy interests did
not outweigh the needs of law enforcement.1 97
On the other hand, Riley tilted the scale towards privacy interests. 19 8
Riley involved two consolidated cases concerning whether police
officers are authorized to search a cellphone as a search incident to
arrest. 199 In 1969, in Chimel v. California,200 and in 1973, in United
States v. Robinson,201 the Cou1rt held that officers could lawfully
188. See id. at 949.
189. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236-37 (1983).
190. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948.
191. See id. at 958 (Alito, J., concurring).
192. See id. at 955 (Sotornayor, J., concurring); id. at 958 (Alito, J., concurring).
193. See id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 958 (Alito, J., concurring).
194. Id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring).
195. Id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
196. Id. at 962 (Alito, J., concurring).
197. Cf Kerr, Equilibrium, supra note 176, at 537.
198. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484-85 (2014).
199. Id. at 2480-81.
200. Chimel v. United States, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
201. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
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conduct a search incident to an arrest against an arrestee. 202 By 2014,
the Court refused to expand searches incident to an arrest to the digital
data in cellphones. 203 Notably, the Court recognized the implications of
digital data searches in the twenty-first century.204 The Court
determined that the privacy interest associated with the digital data in
cellphones substantially outweigh the needs of law enforcement. 205
Applying the rationale in Chimel and Robinson, the Riley Court
held that the digital data in cellphones, unlike physical objects, are less
likely to pose harm against an officer.206 Cellphones are both
qualitatively and quantitatively different compared to physical objects
on an arrestee's person.207 The Court emphasized that a cellphone's
massive storage capacity allows it to contain "the privacies of life" for
many Americans. 208 Therefore, the Court's message was clear: officers
need a warrant to search a cellphone. 209 This holding adjusted Fourth
202. Id. at 235 (holding that searches incident to arrest are reasonable regardless
of the "probability in a particular arrest situation that weapons or evidence would in
fact be found."); Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762-63 (holding that officers' search of
defendant's entire house incident to arrest was unreasonable because the search must
be within the area where an arrestee might have a weapon or destroy evidence); see
also Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 623-24 (2004) (extending searches
incident to arrest inside the vehicle to include the entire passenger's compartment
when there is reason to believe evidence may be found even though defendant was in
custody and there was no threat to officer safety). But see Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S.
332, 343 (2009) (limiting Chimel and Belton in holding that searching the vehicle's
passenger compartment incident to arrest is only reasonable when "the arrestee is
unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment"). In Gant,
defendant was inside the squad car after officers arrested him for driving with a
suspended license. Id. at 344. As a search incident to arrest, officers searched the
inside of defendant's vehicle. Id. The Court found it unlikely that there was evidence
inside the passenger compartment because it was unrelated to defendant's offense.
Id.; see also Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 118-19 (1998) (holding that a search
incident to issuing a citation is unreasonable because the threat to an officer's safety
is less likely compared to a custodial arrest).
203. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2493.
204. See generally id. at 2489-95 (discussing the privacy implications that
would occur if officers are allowed to conduct warrantless searches on cellphones).
205. See id. at 2493-94.
206. Id. at 2485.
207. Id. at 2488-89.
208. Id. at 2494-95 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)).
209. Id. at 2495.
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Amendment precedent in line with technological changes.210 The
question remains whether Riley tilted the scale towards privacy interest
in a way that limits law enforcement's needs to apprehend criminal
activity and preserve officer safety.
It is unlikely that Riley's holding put a burden on law enforcement's
needs to catch criminals and preserve officer safety. In Riley, the Court
noted that officers are allowed to examine a cellphone's physical aspect
to eliminate any potential threat.211 It also found that there is unlikely
any destruction of evidence once officers secure a cellphone. 212 In fact,
as technological advances increase, warrants are more readily
accessible. 213 Officers can request a warrant via email to a judge using
an iPad, and receive a warrant within fifteen minutes.214 Therefore, it is
fair to say that Riley 's holding did not implicate law enforcement's
needs to preserve evidence of criminal activity and to protect officer
safety. While some may argue that Professor Kerr's theory may seem
conceptually too simplistic and broad, the Court's rationale has
indirectly applied Professor Kerr's equilibrium adjustment theory when
it has repeatedly balanced the competing governmental interest and
individual interest at issue. 215
Despite Riley's holding, there is still uncertainty whether electronic
information stored to a service provider is afforded Fourth Amendment
protection. The Court emphasized that the Riley decision did "not
implicate the question whether the collection or inspection of
210. See Kerr, Equilibrium, supra note 176, at 487-88.
211. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2485.
212. Id. at 2486. The government, however, argued that there is a risk because
cellphones are vulnerable to remote wiping and data encryptions. Id. Unconvinced,
the Court noted that officers could take remedial measure to prevent remote wiping
and data encryptions. Id. at 2487.
213. See id. at 2493 (citing Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1561-63
(2013) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
214. Id. at 2493 (quoting McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1561-63 (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
215. See, e.g., Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299-300 (1999)
(explaining that where a Fourth Amendment search inquiry is unclear, it must evaluate
the search based upon the degree it intrudes against an individual's privacy while also
evaluating for the need of legitimate governmental interests); United States v.
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 125 (1984) (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696,
703 (1983)); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239 (1983); Terry v. Ohio, 393 U.S. 1,
21-22, 28 (1968).
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aggregated digital information amounts to a search under other
circumstances." 2 16 Nevertheless, the Riley and Jones rationales provide
the best indication whether the Court would reconsider the third-party
doctrine in the digital age world.217
B. The Privacy of Our Information
Law enforcement's authority to access emails has not been litigated
as much in the criminal context, as compared to cell site location data.
Nevertheless, SCA's language as applied to emails is rampant with
legal fallacies that should be rendered unconstitutional.
In United States v. Warshak,218 the Sixth Circuit ruled that the third-
party doctrine was inapplicable to the contents of emails because the
service provider was merely acting as an intermediary. 2 19 Opponents
may argue that emails are not entitled to Fourth Amendment protection
under the third-party doctrine. Yet, Warshak's rationale on the third-
party doctrine is supported under Riley concerning warrantless searches
of digital data on cellphones.
Many statements made in Riley about a cellphone's notable features
bolster the conclusion that emails are constitutionally protected.220 The
Court described a cellphone as a "minicomputer[]," emphasizing its
immense storage capacity.221 While a standard cellphone contains
sixteen gigabytes, a free email account with Google or Yahoo comes
with at least fifteen gigabytes. 222 Warrantless access to emails gives the
government the ability to keep a watchful eye on people and learn about
one's particular daily activities. 223 Like cellphones, an email has the
216. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489 n.1; see also infra Section V.B-C.
217. See id. at 2491-93; United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956-57 (2012)
(Sotomayor, J., concurring).
218. Warshak v. United States, 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010).
219. Id. at 288.
220. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489.
221. Id.
222. Id.; Comparison of Webmail Providers, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia
org/wiki/Comparison of webmail-providers (last updated Nov. 7, 2016).
223. See Warshak, 631 F.3d at 284-85.
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ability to store countless information on a web-based account that
reveals the "privacies of life." 2 2 4
Most importantly, Riley seems to hint that the content on remote
servers is protected. 225 Notably, the Court discussed special concerns
that extending cellphones as a search incident to arrest may accidently
lead to searches on cloud-based data. 2 2 6 While the government
attempted to justify a search of cellphones, the Court noted that
searching cloud-base data is like "finding a key in a suspect's pocket
and arguing that it allowed law enforcement to unlock and search a
house." 227 This is a strong analogy because common law long
established that "every man's house is his castle," amounting to the
greatest Fourth Amount protection.228 If a cellphone is a key, then the
cloud-based data is presumably the castle. 229 Therefore, Warshak's
decision along with Riley's reasoning about cellphones should be
applied to emails for the Court to make necessary adjustments.
224. Cf Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489. Many online services that are considered
daily activities require an email account, including LinkedIn, Amazon, and Facebook.
See AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com (last visited April 5, 2016); LINKEDIN,
https://www.linkedin.com (last visited April 5, 2016); Facebook,
https://www.facebook.com (last visited April 5, 2016).
225. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2495.
226. See id. at 2491. A cloud-based data allows users to connect wirelessly and
display data on a remote server. Id.; see also Quentin Hardy, The Era of Cloud
Computing, NY Times (June 11, 2014, 7:57 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/
2014/06/1 1/the-era-of-cloud-computing/?_r- 1 (discussing the impact cloud
computing serves because it saves resources due to the amount of data users can stored
and transfer among other networks).
227. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2491.
228. See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 596, 597 n.45 (1980)
(quoting John Adams, in 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 142 (L. Kinvin Wroth &
Hiller B. Zobel eds., 1965)) (discussing that "one of the most essential branches of
English liberty is the freedom of one's house. A man's house is his castle; and while
he is quiet, he is as well as a prince in his castle."); Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S.
103, 115 (2006); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511-12 n.4 (1961); see
also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 478 (1971) (holding that warrantless
search on a man's castle is unreasonable unless there exists "a number of well-defined
exigent circumstances").
229. Cf Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2491.
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C. The Privacy of Our Movements
Unlike emails, SCA's application to cell site location data has been
hotly debated among federal appellate courts. 230 While cell site location
data reveals non-content information, it raises a constitutional concern
because it creates an "intimate picture of [one's] life." 231 The Court has
also recognized that with further advances in surveillance technology,
it might need to re-consider the decision whether long-term monitoring
is unconstitutional. 232 Given the practical necessity to use third parties
in the digital world,233 a normative inquiry must be taken into account
where individual subjective privacy expectations have been
"condition[ed] by influences alien to well-recognized Fourth
Amendment freedoms." 234
Yet, as Smith v. Maryland and United States v. Miller made clear,
voluntarily conveying information to a third party relinquishes the
warrant requirement.235 Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit and Eleventh
Circuit interpreted the third-party doctrine broadly and without
230. See supra Part IV.B.
231. See United State v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff'd
sub nom, United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). The D.C. Circuit Court
described short-term surveillance on an individual's movements in separate isolated
incidents as lawful; however, prolonged surveillance in the aggregate may violate
reasonable expectations of privacy because it illustrates an "intimate picture of one's
life." Id. This is known as the "mosaic theory," where "[p]rolonged surveillance
reveals types of information not revealed by short-term surveillance, such as what a
person does repeatedly, what he does not do, and what he does ensemble. These types
of information can each reveal more about a person than does any individual trip
viewed in isolation." Id. This enables discovery about a person's "public movements
that reflects a wealth of detail about [one's] familial, political, professional, religious,
and sexual associations." Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
232. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 283-84 (1983) (noting that "if such
dragnet type law enforcement practices as respondent envisions should eventually
occur, there will be a time enough then to determine whether different constitutional
principles may be applicable.").
233. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (noting that the third-party doctrine is ill-suited in
today's digital world because "people reveal a great deal of information about
themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.").
234. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 n.5 (1979).
235. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 745-46; United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443-
44 (1976); see also supra Part II.B.
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limitation, despite both circuits recognizing how technological
innovation may change societal expectations of privacy.236
The Fifth Circuit and Eleventh Circuit's application of the third-
party doctrine to cell site location data is wrong. The third-party
doctrine is not supposed to eliminate Fourth Amendment protections
when new technology provides alternative means to access information
that previously required a warrant. 237 Even Maryland's former Attorney
General Even Sachs, who argued Smith, agrees that the Smith case has
been misinterpreted. 238 Smith is a different realm from today's "massive
intrusion" on American privacy.239 Unlike handing a bank deposit slip
or dialing a numerical digit on a telephone, "cell site location data is not
visible or tangible," and cellphone users take no affirmative act to share
their location data to a third party.240 Given the technological advances
since 1979, comparing the pen register used in Smith and the financial
records in Miller is like "saying a ride on a horseback is materially
indistinguishable from a flight to the moon." 241
D. Modernizing the Third-Party Doctrine
Ultimately, the SCA creates a constitutional danger because
officers do not have the "time or expertise" to determine what is needed
236. In re United States for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 610-11 (5th
Cir. 2013); see United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 512 (11th Cir. 2015).
237. Cf Kerr, Equilibrium, supra note 176, at 527-28.
238. 1979 Supreme Court Ruling Becomes Focus of NSA Tactics, NPR (Dec.
21, 2013), http://www.npr.org/2013/12/21/256114227/1979-supreme-court-ruling-
becomes-focus-of-nsa-tactics.
239. See id.
240. United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 355-56 (4th Cir. 2015).
241. Cf Riley v. Cahfornia, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2488 (2014). Even during the last
six years cellphones have evolved exponentially; see United States v. Jones, 132 S.
Ct. 945, 963 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring). The Fifth Circuit and Third Circuit cases
involved cellphone technology from 2010. At the time, cell site location data was only
generated whenever a cellphone user made or received a call; see In re United States,
724 F.3d at 612-13. Cell site location data now automatically generates to the nearest
cell tower periodically. Geolocation Hearing, supra note 148, at 50 (written testimony
of Prof. Blaze); see also Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 963 (Alito, J., concurring) (noting that
the modem smartphone is equipped with a GPS device that enables law enforcement
officials to pinpoint the cellphone's exact location).
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to access specific types of electronic communication.2 4 2 Such
constitutional rights would go unprotected against arbitrary and
intrusive invasions. 243 This goes against the Founders' intent that
prompted the ratification of the Fourth Amendment.2 44
Riley and Jones offer a new path to modernize the third-party
doctrine. A good example for the Court to follow is the Hawaii Supreme
Court's decision in State v. Walton.245 The Hawaii Supreme Court
considered three factors regarding whether a person is entitled to
reasonable privacy expectations under the third-party doctrine: (1)
whether the information reveals "intimate details [about] a person's
life";246 (2) whether the release of information to a third-party was
necessary; and (3) whether the release of information to a third-party
was without realistic alternative. 247 In light of the digital age, these
factors allow for a flexible third-party doctrine where electronic
information is stored on equipment owned by a private service provider.
However, it is unclear when the Court will make necessary
adjustments to the third-party doctrine. Professor Kerr indicated that
there are judicial delays before there is an equilibrium-adjustment.2 4 8
There was the forty year gap between Katz and Olmstead, and there was
the forty-one year gap between Robinson and Riley.249 It has now been
almost forty years since the decision in Smith v. Maryland. The Court
has stated that it must preserve privacy protections that correspond with
technological changes. 250 Yet, the Court has also recognized that it must
proceed with caution when considering privacy expectations and Fourth
242. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 211-14 (1979); see also Oliver
v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 181-82 (1984) (noting that "this Court repeatedly has
acknowledged the difficulties created for courts, police, and citizens by an ad hoc
analysis, case-by-case definition of the Fourth Amendment standards to be applied in
differing factual circumstances.").
243. Oliver, 446 U.S. at 181-82.
244. See LASSON, supra note 27, at 54.
245. State v. Walton, 324 P.3d 876 (Haw. 2014).
246. Id. at 907 (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 748 (1979) (Stewart,
J., dissenting)).
247. See id. at 906-07.
248. See Kerr, Equilibrium, supra note 176, at 539.
249. Id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 202-03.
250. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33-34 (2001).
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Amendment issues related to emerging technology. 251 Without judicial
adjustments, Professor Kerr indicates that judicial delay would likely
prompt legislative action. 252
VI. THE PROPOSED REVISION FOR THE STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT
United States Supreme Court Associate Justice Samuel Alito has
noted that Congress is in a better position to solve issues associated with
electronic surveillance, rather than federal courts applying the Fourth
Amendment. 253 "A legislative body is well situated to gauge changing
public attitudes, to draw detailed lines, and to balance privacy in a
comprehensive way." 254 Congress or state legislatures should "enact
legislation that draws reasonable distinctions based on . .. electronic
surveillance." 2 55 Justice Alito's message helped spark the enactment of
California Senate Bill 178.256
A. California Electronic Communication Privacy Act of 2016
California recently enacted Senate Bill 178, reaffirming the
requirements for law enforcement to obtain electronic stored
information. 257 Senate Bill 178, known as California Electronic
Communication Privacy Act ("CalECPA") of 2016, went into effect
January 1, 2016.258 CalECPA requires officers to secure a warrant based
251. City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 759 (2010).
252. See Kerr, Equilibrium, supra note 176, at 541.
253. See Riley v. California 134 S. Ct 2473, 2497 (2014) (Alito, J. concurring);
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 963-64 (2012) (Alito, J. concurring); see also
Jess Bravin, A Younger Alito Backed Privacy Protections, THE WALL STREET J. (July
10, 2013, 2:01 P.M.), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324879
504578597652669686138 (discussing a student conference Justice Alito conducted
as a Princeton undergraduate regarding privacy implications in the emerging digital
age).
254. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J. concurring).
255. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2497 (Alito, J., concurring).
256. See S.B. 178, B. Analysis, July 13, 2015, at 7 (Cal. 2015-2016 Reg. Sess.),
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billAnalysisClient.xhtml?billid=201520160
SB178.
257. S. B. 178, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015), 2015 Cal. Stat. ch. 651.
258. Patrick McGreevy et al., California's New Laws for 2016: See How You
Are Affected, Los ANGELES TIMES (Dec. 31, 2015, 12:05 AM),
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upon probable cause before accessing any. electronic stored
information. 259
Electronic stored information includes content inf6rmation like
emails, digital documents, and digital data stored on the cloud while
non-content information includes any metadata information like cell
site location data.260 Accordingly, CalECPA expands and strengthens
privacy legislation that corresponds with modem technology.261
Amending the SCA similar to CalECPA would provide a uniform,
standardized bright-line rule for law enforcement. Therefore,
Congressional efforts should follow California's lead.
B. Requiring a Search Warrant Creates Proper Transparency
Thirty years after the SCA's enactment, it is apparent that the SCA
is inadequate. With recent technological innovations, law enforcement
agencies exploit outdated federal privacy legislation in accessing emails
and using cellphones as tracking devices without a warrant. 262
Following CalECPA would replace the distinctions between an ECS
and an RCS, and would also provide a remedy provision similar to the
exclusionary rule.263 Even the San Diego Police Officers Association
supports CaIECPA's enactment because it "strengthens community
http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-g-califomia-new-laws- 2 0 16-
htmlstory.html.
259. MAINTENANCE OF THE CODES, ch. 86, sec. 234, § 1546.1(a), S.B. 1171
(Cal. 2016 Reg. Sess.), http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.
xhtml?billid=201120120SB1171; see Assemb. Comm. on Pub. Safety, S.B. 178, B.
Analysis, July 13, 2015, at 7 (Cal. 2015-2016 Reg. Sess.).
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billAnalysisClient.xhtml?billid=2015
20160SBl78.
260. See MAINTENANCE OF THE CODES, ch. 86, sec. 233, § 1546.1. Section
1546(d) includes "sender, recipients, format, or location of the sender, or recipients at
any point during the communication, the time or date of the communication was
created, sent, or received, or any information pertaining to any individual or device
participating in the communication, including, but not limited to, an IP address." Id.
261. See S.B. 178, B. Analysis, July 13, 2015, at 6 (Cal. 2015-2016 Reg. Sess.),
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billAnalysisClient.xhtml?bill-id=201520160
SB178.
262. Id. at 6-7.
263. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546.4 (West 2016).
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relationships and increases transparency [and] in the best interest of all
Californians." 264
Figure 1: This chart summarizes the different procedures to access
electronic stored information under the SCA. Following CalECPA's
example will create privacy protections and create proper transparency
and oversight among law enforcement agencies.
SCA Unopened email in Search Warrant
electronic storage 180 required
days or less
SCA Unopened email in Subpoena with notice;
electronic storage more 2703(d) court order; or
than 180 days search warrant
SCA Opened email, remote Subpoena with notice;
computer service 2703(d) court order; or
information search warrant
SCA Non-content records 2703(d) court order or
search warrant
SCA Basic subscriber Subpoena or 2703(d)
information: non- court order.
content information
CalECPA Electronic Warrant accompanying
Communication order requiring the
Information from a service provider
service provider authenticate provided
electronic information.
Opponents, however, may argue that this will overburden law
enforcement. There is no denying that officers should have access to
technological tools to aid their search for the truth.265 The societal
interest in law enforcement using technological resources is important
because it enhances criminal investigations to apprehend criminals. 266
But, as like technology aids in criminal investigations, the exploitation
of technological advances can also implicate the Fourth Amendment. 267
264. Chris Conley, California Leads on Electronic Privacy Other States Must
Follow, ACLU (Oct. 13, 2015), https://www.aclunc.org/blog/califomia-leads-
electronic-privacy-other-states-must-follow.
265. United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 518 (11th Cir. 2015).
266. Id.
267. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 712 (1984).
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Accordingly, a warrant requirement to access -emails and cell site
location data should not be viewed as a burden on law enforcement. 268
Instead, it should be viewed as proper transparency and a constitutional
guide for law enforcement. 269 The warrant requirement is a highly
valued practice in the Constitution.270 Therefore, during routine
criminal investigations, officers should seek a. warrant to access
electronic stored information site location data and emails, unless
exigent circumstances arise.
CONCLUSION
Going back to the Paris attacks, increasing government surveillance
is unnecessary. The United States already has the ability to monitor any
individual. 271 By focusing more on national security and limiting Fourth
Amendment safeguards, statutory protections will continue to fail in
providing a proper balance between privacy and public safety.
Instead, the question is how privacy legislation should change.
What should privacy legislation protect, and to what extent? The SCA's
complex language and application is incompatible with modem
technology. This Comment drew upon emails and cell site location data
to show how the SCA consists of legal fallacies that implicate the
Fourth Amendment.
Given that the SCA was enacted thirty years ago, this Comment
also drew upon an alternative solution using Professor Kerr's
equilibrium-adjustment theory on Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
Whether the Court or Congress will act first is a matter of time. If the
judiciary is to act first, it must recognize that evolving technology
demands evolving law. Strictly applying Smith v. Maryland and United
States v. Miller can no longer justify its broad application to any
information conveyed to a third party. Doing so will ignore the impact
electronic communication has on modem society.
On the other hand, Congress may be in a better position, as Justice
Alito noted. If so, Congress should follow CalECPA's example to
provide a clear standard. Currently, the government's ability to access
268. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 481 (1971).
269. See id.
270. Id.
271. See McCarthy, supra note 11.
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emails and cell site location data without a warrant violates people's
personal freedom. This should not be allowed without a warrant or
unless exigent circumstances arise.
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